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ABSTRACT PAGE
Social contract theory (Cosmides, 1989) hypothesizes that the presence of social 
exchange content activates the evolved cheater detection mechanism, which is specifically 
designed to monitor for violations of socially prescribed rules or contracts. More recently, 
Yamagishi (Yamagishi, 1998; Kiyonari & Yamagishi, 2000) has proposed a connection 
between general levels of trust towards others and sensitivity to information regarding the 
untrustworthiness of a potential interaction partner. The current study was designed to 
integrate social contract theory and Yamagishi’s work on trust. It was hypothesized that if 
generalized trust influences the level of suspicion people hold towards others, then this 
should in turn influence the cheater detection mechanism. Yamagishi has also proposed 
that trust develops out of an individual’s socio-cultural experiences which can be 
operationalizied as social intelligence. This prediction that social intelligence influences the 
relationship between trust and cheater detection was also tested.
iv
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1Trust and Cheater Detection: Evolved Cognitive Mechanisms for Social Exchange 
For over 25 years, evolutionary psychologists have been investigating the 
neurocognitive adaptations for human cooperation. One aspect of human cooperation in 
particular, social exchange, has received a large amount of attention from evolutionary- 
minded researchers (Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Fiddick, Cosmides & 
Tooby, 2000; Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992). Social exchange can be defined as an 
interaction between two parties where one party provides a benefit to the other with the 
expectation that the act will be reciprocated. Social exchange is a broad category, 
including explicit or implicit agreements, immediate or deferred exchange, and may take 
place between individuals or more complex social structures (Cosmides, 2005). Thus 
social exchanges can take the form of a simple transfer of goods from one individual to 
another, or a more complicated relationship between an individual and a social 
institution. The common element present in all social exchanges is the presence of costs 
and benefits for all parties involved in the interaction.
Historically, evolutionary social exchange research can be divided into two 
methodological paradigms: the Wason task and the prisoner’s dilemma. These two 
research paradigms, both designed to address the issue of social exchange, focus on two 
separate but related adaptive problems. In order for reciprocal exchange to evolve, at 
least two conditions must be satisfied. First, individuals must be motivated to cooperate. 
That is, reciprocal exchange cannot take place if no one is interested in forming such 
relationships (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). Second, once an exchange relationship has 
been formed, involved parties must possess the ability to detect and punish cheaters 
(Axelrod, 1984; Trivers, 1971). The prisoner’s dilemma is well suited to testing
2hypotheses regarding how and when individuals will cooperate, while the Wason task is 
preferable when studying how and when people detect cheating.
Although both the motivation to cooperate and the ability to guard against 
exploitation are equally important (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992), research on cheater 
detection has overshadowed much of the prisoner’s dilemma research on the motivation 
to engage in social exchange (Kiyonari & Yamagishi, 2000). The primary reason for this 
imbalance has to do with the particularly robust findings in the Wason task literature 
regarding the conditions under which humans effectively detect potential instances of 
cheating. Since 1985, Cosmides and colleagues have proposed and tested hypotheses 
regard the detection of cheating within social exchanges. This research program has led 
to the articulation and development of social contract theory (SCT). Social contract 
theory starts with the well established premise that mutual cooperation cannot evolve 
without the ability to detect and punish cheaters (Axelrod, 1984; Trivers, 1971). It goes 
on to hypothesize the existence of an evolved mechanism designed specifically to detect 
cheating within the context of social exchange (the cheater detection mechanism; CDM).
Recently Yamagishi and colleagues, primarily prisoner’s dilemma researchers 
interested in the development of trust as a precursor to cooperation, have drawn attention 
to the fact that while cheater detection is important, it would be a useless skill if no one 
was motivated to cooperate in the first place (Kiyonari, Tanida, & Yamagishi, 2000). In 
other words, cheater detection is only beneficial once a person has decided to unilaterally 
cooperate. Starting with that simple observation, the two experimental paradigms are 
mapped onto Pruitt and Kimmel’s (1977) goal/expectation theory of cooperation. 
According to this theory, before mutual cooperation can be obtained, two conditions have
3to be satisfied: 1) the goal of the interaction must be transformed from the narrow pursuit 
of self-interest to one of mutual gain, and 2) the interaction partner must be expected to 
forego the narrow pursuit of self-interest as well. According to Yamagishi and 
colleagues, cheater detection research focuses on the second, “expectation” component of 
the theory.
Kiyonari, Tanida, and Yamagishi (2000) go on to hypothesize that if humans 
possess a CDM designed to protect against those who would break the “expectation” of 
cooperation, then we should also possess a mechanism designed to motivate us towards 
the goal of mutual cooperation. Yamagishi and colleagues call this second mechanism 
the Social Exchange Heuristic (SEH). Yamagishi and colleagues have made several 
untested predictions about the nature of this mechanism, many of which have potential 
implications for SCT. It is the purpose of the current study to test these predictions, 
seeking a potential integration of SCT and the SEH. The following sections outline, in 
greater detail, the two theories and then discuss how they may be interrelated.
Cheater Detection in Social Exchange
The Wason selection task has been used since the 1960’s as a tool to understand 
the nature of human logical reasoning (Wason, 1966). Karl Popper postulated that 
science was based on the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning, that is, the 
search for examples that contradict a given hypothesis (Popper, 1959). Wason developed 
the selection task in an attempt to determine if humans use this same deductive logic in 
everyday life. Thus the Wason task tests a participant’s ability to search for violations of 
a hypothesis. The hypothesis in a Wason task is presented as a conditional rule of the 
form I fP  then Q. Participants are asked to look for potential violations of the rule by
4examining a set of four facts, represented by four cards. The cards have information on 
both sides. The conditional hypothesis to be evaluated concerns the relationship between 
the information on both sides of the cards. It is the participant’s task to determine which 
cards need to be turned over in order to check for violations of the rule. The information 
visible to participants corresponds to P, not P, Q, and not Q. If a card has information 
about P on one side, then the other side will have information about Q, and vice versa. 
Correctly solving the task requires participants to select the cards that represent P and not
Q-
Despite the apparent simplicity of the standard, abstract Wason task, it is very 
difficult for participants to solve correctly. It is not uncommon for fewer than 20% of 
participants to correctly solve standard versions of the task (Cosmides 1989; Gigerenzer 
& Hug, 1992). Since its inception, a large literature has emerged dedicated to 
understanding the source of the selection task’s difficulty and the ways in which 
performance can be improved. For example, it has been suggested that more realistic 
rules facilitate performance on the task (Wason & Shapiro, 1971). However tests of that 
hypothesis have failed to find such an effect (Manktelow & Evans, 1979). It has also 
been suggested that prior, real-world experience with a particular rule helps to facilitate 
task performance (Cox & Griggs, 1982), which has subsequently been ruled out as a 
plausible hypothesis (Cosmides, 1989). From this research, a confusing pattern began to 
emerge in which certain manipulations improved performance while others had no effect. 
Furthermore, no existing theory seemed to link together and effectively explain the 
various performance-enhancing manipulations.
5However, in 1989, Cosmides analyzed the existing pattern of Wason results in 
terms of the type of tasks the human mind was designed to solve. This evolutionary task 
analysis ultimately led to the development of SCT, which currently provides the most 
comprehensive and parsimonious explanation of Wason task performance. Social 
contract theory is grounded in an evolutionary analysis of social cooperation and 
reciprocity which argues that human sociality could not evolve without the ability to 
detect and punish cheaters (Axelrod, 1984; Trivers, 1971). Based on this premise, 
Cosmides hypothesized that humans possess a “look for cheaters” algorithm (the CDM) 
which is activated during social exchange situations. Social exchanges can be expressed 
in the Wason task by a rule with the following structure: I f  you take the benefit, then you 
must meet the requirements (i.e. pay the costs). Cheating on this rule involves the taking 
of a benefit without paying the associated cost. Furthermore, solving a social contract 
Wason task correctly, choosing the P and not Q cards, is synonymous with correctly 
detecting potential instances of cheating.
According to Cosmides, many of the studies that reported improved Wason 
performance in the past were unknowingly manipulating social exchange content, 
subsequently activating the CDM. For example, Cheng and Holyoak (1985) constructed 
a content-free Wason task that elicited high levels of performance. This abstract Wason 
task contained the rule “I f  one is to take action A, then one must first satisfy precondition 
B. ” According to Cosmides (1989), Cheng and Holyoak’s rule, although abstract, 
contains an implicit cost-benefit structure. Saying someone must satisfy a precondition is 
just another way of saying that they must pay a cost or meet a requirement. Furthermore, 
paying a cost to be allowed to take a particular action is a linguistic cue that the action is
6beneficial. Supporting her analysis, Cosmides constructed Wason tasks that were 
identical, manipulating only the presence of social exchange content. Consistent with her 
hypothesis, the social contract tasks facilitated performance to a significant degree. For 
example, Cosmides created the Grover School Wason task which has the following rule: 
“I f  a student is to be assigned to Grover school, then that student must live in Grover 
city. ” The content of each Wason task was identical expect for one crucial manipulation: 
The presence of social exchange cues. In the non-social contract version, the participant 
was cued into the perspective of someone monitoring board of education volunteers who 
were given the task of assigning incoming students to the appropriate school. The 
scenario mentions two cities and their corresponding schools: Grover City, Grover 
school, Hanover City, and Hanover school. Volunteers are supposed to use the rule when 
assigning students. It is the task of the participant to make sure no violations of the rule 
occur. The social contract version includes two additional pieces of information. First, 
participants are told that Grover school is a much better school than Hanover. Second, 
each volunteer has a child enter the school system and each volunteer assigned their own 
child to a school. This additional information provides a motive for volunteers to cheat 
on the rule in order to ensure that their own child gets into the better of the two schools. 
Again, it is the task of the participant to monitor for violations of the rule. Simply adding 
the social exchange content to the Grover school task increased performance by 45 
percent (30% correct in the non-social contract version versus 75% correct in the social 
contract version). Subsequently, Cosmides’ original results have been replicated across 
many different experiments using a variety of Wason tasks (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; 
Gigerenzer & Hug, 1993; Fiddick & Cummins, 2001).
In summary, SCT states that humans possess an evolved mechanism specifically 
designed to detect cheating in social exchange. This mechanism is activated by the 
presence of a social exchange, that is, a relationship involving the reciprocal exchange of 
benefits. The Wason task has been used to show that when social exchange content is 
present, participants are particularly adept at solving the task correctly, that is, detecting 
instances of potential cheating. However, the ability to detect cheating is not the only 
prerequisite for the evolution of human cooperation. Before the ability to detect cheating 
can have any significance at all, humans have to be motivated to cooperate, that is, to 
enter into social exchanges. Recently, Yamagishi and colleagues have begun analyzing 
this facet of the evolution of human cooperation. The resulting theoretical framework is 
a marriage of Yamagishi’s earlier work on trust and the game theoretical approach to 
human cooperation (Kiyonari, Tanida, & Yamagishi, 2000; Yamagishi 1998; Yamagishi 
& Kikuchi, 2001).
The Social Exchange Heuristic and Trust
Trust, Gullibility, and Social Intelligence. A popular belief about highly trusting 
individuals is that they are naive or gullible. Indeed, there exists empirical evidence to 
support this claim. For example, Gurtman and Lion (1982) have argued that high trust is 
an indicator of the indiscriminant acceptance of information provided by others. 
Similarly, Garske (1976) suggests that highly trusting individuals have a less complex 
cognitive structure than less trusting individuals which is less useful for interpreting the 
behavior of others. However intuitively convincing this view may be, a significant body 
of research does not support this connection between trust and gullibility (Rotter, 1980). 
The aforementioned conception of trust relies on defining trust as the willingness to
8accept information provided by others. If trust equals acceptance of information, then by 
definition, trustful people are gullible. However, if as Rotter (1967) suggests, trust 
relates to an individual’s general expectations of other people’s trustworthiness than the 
connection between trust and gullibility is severed. Believing that other will generally 
tend to act in a trustworthy manner is logically independent from how likely one is to 
actually accept what others say. Thus, according to Rotter (1980), general trust can be 
defined as default expectations regarding other people’s trustworthiness, while gullibility 
is insensitivity to information suggesting untrustworthiness.
Building upon Rotter’s conceptual framework, Yamagishi and colleagues 
(Yamagishi, Kikuchi, & Kosugi, 1999) argue that under certain conditions, high-trusters 
are actually more vigilant than low-trusters when dealing with others. In a series of 
experiments, first conducted by Kosugi and Yamagishi (1998), participants’ sensitivity to 
information revealing the trustworthiness or untrustworthiness of others was analyzed. 
Participants were shown short vignettes and asked whether the person depicted in them 
would act in a trustworthy manner or not. When no information about the character in 
the story was provided, as expected, high-trusters rated the person more likely to act in a 
trustworthy manner than did low-trusters. Similarly, when content was added to the story 
relating positive information about the character, the same pattern emerged. However, 
when negative information was added suggesting that the person in the story had acted in 
an untrustworthy manner in the past, the pattern of results reversed. That is, high-trusters 
rated the person as being significantly less likely to act in a trustworthy manner than did 
low-trusters. Thus, when the person depicted in the story was portrayed as being
9potentially untrustworthy, high-trusters were much more suspicion of the characters 
intentions as compared to low-trusters.
Kakiuchi & Yamagishi (1997) replicated this effect in the context of the 
prisoner’s dilemma (PD) paradigm. The classic PD is a type of non-zero-sum game in 
which two players choose to “cooperate” or “defect”, independent of what the other 
player does. The concern for both players is to maximize their payoff, without any 
concern for the other player. The standard payoff matrix in a PD results in defection 
being the optimal strategy, regardless of what the other player does. The iterated PD is a 
variant of the classic paradigm where two players engage in repeated trials. In the 
iterated PD, mutual cooperation can emerge as a result of the player’s ability to punish 
their partner’s defection on subsequent trials with a defection of their own.
Kakiuchi & Yamagishi (1997) conducted an iterated PD experiment with the 
added twist that in addition to choosing between cooperating and defecting, participants 
could adjust the structure of the payoff matrix in response to their partner’s behavioral 
decision. Participants were allowed the option to increase or decrease the size of their 
own monetary payoff. However, increasing the size of their own payoff had the 
additional effect of increasing their potential loss if the other player defected.
Conversely, decreasing the size of one’s own payoff lowered the potential losses accrued 
if a partner defected. Thus, if trust was established between the two players, increasing 
the size of one’s own payoff was the optimal decision. However, if a participant could 
not trust his/her partner, reducing the size of their own payoff was the safest option. 
Participants played a series of three, 16-trial blocks. The results of this experiment 
supported the hypothesis that high-trusters are more sensitive to information suggesting
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the untrustworthiness of another person. In the first block of the trials, high-trusters were 
much more likely to lower their own payoff when their partner defected, minimizing their 
losses. Low-trusters showed the opposite pattern and tended to increase their own payoff 
regardless of their partners behavior choice. It wasn’t until block two of the trials that 
low-trusters began to adjust their payoff matrix in accord with their partner’s behavior 
decisions. Across all three trials, high-trusters were much more responsive to their 
partner’s tendency to cooperate or defect, adjusting their own payoff matrix accordingly. 
As a result, as measured by the total amount of money earning in the game, high-trusters 
profited significantly more than low-trusters.
The rationale for Yamagishi’s sensitivity-to-information hypothesis comes from 
his earlier work on the emancipation theory of trust (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). 
According to the theory, trust and commitment formation represent alternative solutions 
to the problem of uncertainty in social exchange. Social uncertainty is a serious problem 
for the development of human cooperation. The potential benefits of cooperation, 
enhanced personal gain, come with the potential cost of exploitation. Yamagishi and 
Yamagishi (1994) define social uncertainty as existing for an actor when 1) their 
exchange partner has incentives to act in a way that imposes costs on the actor (i.e. cheat 
them), and 2) the actor does not have the requisite information to accurately predict 
his/her partner’s behavior.
Kollock’s (as cited in Yamagishi, Kikuchi, & Kosugi, 1999) analysis of the rice 
and rubber trades in Southeast Asia is a perfect illustration of the differences between 
trust and commitment relationships. The quality of rice is readily apparent, and as such, 
the buyer has little worry of being cheated by the seller. In contrast, it is impossible to
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determine the quality of raw rubber until it has been processed. As a result, the buyers of 
raw rubber are at a significant risk of being cheated by unknowingly purchasing a low 
quality product. According to Kollock, the difference in social uncertainty in the trades 
of rice and raw rubber explain the dominant forms of trade for each good. Rice is traded 
in open markets among relative strangers, while the trade of raw rubber typically occurs 
in the context of long-term exchange relationships.
The rice trade is what Yamagishi (1998) would call a trust relationship, while raw 
rubber is traded by the formation of commitment relationships. Yamagishi suggests that 
Kollock’s analysis, while instructive, is incomplete. Although he is in agreement with 
Kollock regarding commitment relationships as a solution to the problem of social 
uncertainty (Yamagishi, Cooke, & Watabe, 1998), Yamagishi draws attention to the 
influence of opportunity costs on social relationships and trust (Yamagishi, Kikuchi, & 
Kosugi, 1999). Commitment relationships trade opportunities to interact with alternate 
exchange partners for security (i.e. a long-term relationship). This is an effective means 
of solving the problem of social uncertainty only if the costs of missed exchange 
opportunities are less than the stability gains associated with commitment (i.e. reducing 
the likelihood of being cheated by your exchange partner). However, when opportunity 
costs are high -  when the number of potential quality exchange partners is high -  
commitment relationships are a liability. The central tenet of the emancipation theory of 
trust is that high degrees of generalized trust act as a springboard, allowing individuals to 
break out of the constraints of a commitment relationship when higher quality exchange 
partners are present. Thus, trust acts to “emancipate” people from the stability of 
commitment relations despite the presence of social uncertainty.
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However, deserting commitment relationships under conditions of social 
uncertainty is not without its costs. With each new exchange partner comes the potential 
for being exploited. Yamagishi (1998) argues that it is this combination of high social 
uncertainty and opportunity costs that explains high-truster’s sensitivity to trust-relevant 
information. In a social environment with a large number of exchange opportunities, 
trust, as conceptualized by Yamagishi, may prove advantageous for two reasons. First, 
having a high degree of generalized trust towards others would facilitate interaction 
between strangers. Second, it would help guard against the perils of a socially uncertain 
environment through increased informational sensitivity. By way of example, Yamagishi 
& Yamagishi (1994) compared the social structure of American and Japanese societies. 
They argue that Japanese society is largely organized around highly structured 
commitment relationships (i.e. the business practice of life-long employment), virtually" 
eliminating social uncertainty and opportunity costs. In contrast, American society is 
much more “open”, and subsequently is characterized by a relatively large amount of 
social uncertainty and opportunity cost. Applying the emancipation theory of trust to 
American and Japanese society leads to a rather counter-intuitive prediction. That is, 
Americans should report average levels of generalized trust that are higher than the 
Japanese. Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) found support for this hypothesis by 
surveying a large number of American and Japanese college students. Their results are 
corroborated by a large-scale study conducted by The Institute of Statistical Mathematics 
over a decade earlier (Hayashi, Suzuki, Suzuki, & Murakami, 1982).
If generalized trust towards others is adaptive, that is, it helps to facilitate 
interaction between strangers as well as guards against potential exploitation, then how
does it develop? Yamagishi, Kikuchi, and Kosugi (1999) propose that social intelligence 
is responsible for calibrating both levels of trust and sensitivity to potential exploitation. 
Their argument is as follows: Those that grow up in a socially uncertain environment, 
with a high degree of opportunity costs devote more cognitive resources to the 
development of skills for discerning the trustworthiness of others. This view assumes 
generalized trust to be a byproduct of social intelligence. That is, having highly 
developed social intelligence allows trust to develop because of an increased ability to 
detect and interpret the behavior of others -  particularly those cues that suggest 
untrustworthiness. However, in a stable social environment, such as traditional Japanese 
society, social intelligence is less likely to develop. The security offered by such an 
environment precludes the need for high levels of trust or vigilance.
The Social Exchange Heuristic. Recently, Kiyonari, Tanida, and Yamagishi 
(2000) have attempted to reformulate Yamagishi’s earlier work on trust and social 
intelligence into a pseudo-evolutionary theory of human cooperation. They begin by 
accepting Cosmides and Tooby’s (1992) argument that social exchange has played a 
central role in human evolutionary history and that the achievement of mutual 
cooperation was one of the most crucial adaptive tasks faced by our ancestors. Social 
contract theory focuses on only one aspect of this adaptive problem -  the detection of 
cheaters. However, if individuals are not willing to enter into mutually cooperative 
relationships in the first place, the ability to detect cheating is inconsequential. Building 
upon the framework of Pruitt and Kimmels’s (1977) goal/expectation theory of 
cooperation, Kiyonari, Tanida, & Yamagishi (2000) posit that the achievement of mutual 
cooperation requires that 1) individuals be motivated to work towards the goal of
14
reciprocal exchange, and 2) they expect interaction partners to adopt a similar goal.
Social contract theory’s focus is on the expectation components of the model -  detecting 
cheating only makes sense if you expect a potential interaction partner to cooperate. The 
theoretical framework that Yamagishi and colleagues developed to explain the goal 
component of human cooperation is called the SEH.
The SEH, similar to the CDM, is hypothesized to be a cognitive mechanism that 
evolved for the specific purpose of facilitating human cooperation. The SEH is activated 
when cues to social exchange are present, and once activated leads individuals to 
transform an exchange opportunity from a situation in which the goal is the pursuit of 
strict self-interest to that of mutual cooperation. Research using the standard prisoner’s 
dilemma paradigm illustrates the activation of the SEH. Recall that in the standard 
prisoner’s dilemma the behavioral decision of non-cooperation or defection is the rational 
choice. However, experimental studies repeatedly show that participants do not act 
rationally, and in fact, tend to cooperate at much higher levels than logic would suggest.
In fact, when asked, participants tend to prefer the outcome of mutual cooperation despite 
lower personal gains (Kollock, 1994). Yamagishi and colleagues argue that prisoner’s 
dilemma games are social exchanges and activate the SEH. As such, participants 
transform the optimal outcome of the game from one in which their own gains are 
maximized, to one in which mutual cooperation is preferred. A series of prisoner’s 
dilemma experiments were conducted in order to illustrate the operation of the SEH as 
well as rule out alternative hypotheses (see Kiyonari, Tanida, & Yamagishi, 2000). The 
overall message of these experiments was that the majority of participants played the 
standard prisoner’s dilemma game “irrationally” -  they behaved as if the optimal payoffs
15
were obtained when mutual cooperation was achieved (when both players cooperated).
In short, perceiving the game as a social exchanged caused participants to adopt the goal 
of mutual cooperation, instead of the pursuit of strict self-interest.
Trust and the Social Exchange Heuristic. Recall that Yamagishi’s emancipation 
theory of trust argues that high levels of generalized trust motivate people to seek out 
new exchange partners when opportunity costs are high. This high level of trust is also 
associated with increased informational sensitivity that leads to higher levels of suspicion 
regarding potentially untrustworthy interaction partners. Similarly, in the context of the 
prisoner’s dilemma, activation of the SEH results in adopting the goal of mutual 
cooperation. Yamagishi and colleagues have hypothesized that individuals with high 
levels of generalized trust have a stronger or “more activated” SEH. This makes sense if 
the purpose of generalized trust is to facilitate social exchange between strangers under 
conditions of social uncertainty. Furthermore, if the detection of cheaters within social 
exchange is just as important as adopting the goal of mutual cooperation, the two 
mechanisms should be intimately linked. A central, untested research issue that emerges 
from this potential link is the rather counter-intuitive hypothesis that individuals with a 
strong SEH (i.e. high-trusters) are particularly good at detecting cheaters within the 
context of social exchange.
Trust and Cheater Detection
It is this link between trust and cheater detection that the current study is meant to 
explore. Yamagishi’s theorizing about trust’s role in social exchange has clear 
implications for SCT. The most obvious similarity between Yamagishi’s SEH and the 
CDM is that they are both hypothesized to be activated within the context of a social
16
exchange relationship. If that is indeed true, then both mechanisms should be activated in 
tandem. This proposition makes sense not only from a logical perspective, but 
theoretically as well. Yamagishi (Kiyonari, Tanida, & Yamagishi, 2000) and Cosmides 
(Cosmides and Tooby, 1992) have argued that both the desire for reciprocal exchange 
and the ability to detect cheaters are crucial for the evolution of human cooperation. 
However, much of the focus has been on the ability to detect cheaters and SCT has 
remained relatively unchanged since its introduction nearly 20 years ago. Given that the 
SEH and the CDM operate within the same domain of human cooperation and are 
hypothesized to be activated by the same social cues, it is the primary purpose of the 
current study to explore trust’s role in the ability of humans to detect cheating within the 
context of social exchanges.
If activation of the SEH results in increased informational sensitivity when 
engaged in social exchange, then it is plausible that such increased suspicion or vigilance 
would translate into enhanced cheater detection. However, outside of exchange 
relationships, there is no theoretical reason to expect such a relationship between trust 
and cheater detection since neither the SEH nor the CDM would be active. Study 1 is 
designed to answer this important preliminary question: does trust moderate the 
relationship between social exchange and cheater detection? That is, do high trusters, 
with a potentially stronger SEH, excel at detecting cheating within the context of a social 
exchange?
Hypothesis 1: High-trusters will be more likely to correctly solve social 
contract Wason tasks than low trusters. However, this effect will 
disappear when social exchange content is removed.
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If trust does influence the ability to detect cheaters then several additional 
questions emerge. First, is it that generalized trust directly influences the CDM, or is the 
relationship mediated by the sensitivity-to-information effect? Yamagishi would argue 
that trust increases sensitivity to information, which would raise the level of suspicion or 
vigilance an individual might have towards others. This increased suspicion may result 
in a stronger CDM response. Study 2 proposes and tests a mediational model that is 
consistent with the above hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: High-trusters will have significantly more suspicion 
towards others when information suggesting the untrustworthiness of 
others is present, which will result in enhanced cheater detection.
An additional research question that can be derived from an integration of the 
SEH and SCT is whether or not Yamagishi’s prediction that socio-cultural context (i.e. 
the degree of social uncertainty and opportunity cost) calibrates generalized levels of 
trust, in turn moderates the ability to detect cheaters. Specifically, Yamagishi argues that 
a high degree of generalized trust is beneficial in an environment characterized by social 
uncertainty and high opportunity costs. When social uncertainty and opportunity cost are 
low, a high degree of generalized trust becomes less beneficial. Based on this analysis, 
Study 3 seeks to determine if socio-cultural context moderates the relationship between 
trust and cheater detection.
Hypothesis 3: High-trusters will outperform low-trusters on Wason tasks 
scenarios that are characterized by high social uncertainty and opportunity 
costs. However, the trust effect will disappear when social uncertainty 
and opportunity costs are low.
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Study 3 also tests Yamagishi’s prediction that social intelligence is the primary 
factor responsible for the development of generalized trust. Yamagishi’s analysis of 
social intelligence is from a cognitive-developmental perspective. That is, when 
individuals are faced with a complex social environment (i.e. high social uncertainty and 
opportunity cost) the acquisition of social intelligence results in enhanced cognitive 
functioning in regards to picking up on cues of untrustworthiness. This increased 
vigilance allows for the development of trust relationships since high-trusters are better 
protected from the costs of exploitation. If social intelligence is responsible for this 
enhanced sensitivity to information, it is plausible that it is also at the root of cheater 
detection. Study 3 provides a test of a model that is consistent with the above analysis.
Hypothesis 4: The relationship between social intelligence and cheater
detection is mediated by generalized trust.
Study 1
Study 1 was designed to test the prediction that high-trusters are better able to 
detect cheaters than low-trusters within the context of a social exchange. If high levels of 
generalized trust are associated with increased sensitivity to trust-relevant information 
about others (Yamagishi, Kikuchi & Kosugi, 1999), then it is plausible to hypothesize 
that this increased apprehension translates into more accurate cheater detection.
However, in line with SCT, the CDM should only be activated within the context of a 
social exchange (Cosmides, 1989).
To test this prediction, a Wason task was used to measure participant’s ability to 
detect cheaters. Two versions of the Wason task were created. In one version of the task 
participants were cued into a situation involving a social contract, while the second
version of the task lacked a social-contract component. Roughly half of the participants 
received the social contract task, while the remainder solved the non-social contract task. 
Participants were also given a trust scale designed to measure generalized levels of trust 
towards others. It was hypothesized that generalized trust would moderate the 
relationship between social exchange and cheater detection. Specifically, levels of trust 
should affect Wason task performance only for those participants who are in the social 
contract condition. In addition, according to Yamagishi’s predictions, higher levels of 
trust should be associated with increased Wason task performance.
A secondary, more exploratory analysis was also conducted in Study 1. By 
limiting the analysis to only those participants who solved the Wason task mcorrectly, it 
is possible to determine if there is a relationship between generalized trust and the 
identification of instances of potential cheating. In other words, who is more likely to see 
potential instances of cheating, regardless of accuracy, high-trusters or low-trusters? The 
total number of cards selected by each participant was used as a measure of how 
suspicious they were of the potential for cheating. In a typical Wason task, the number of 
chosen cards corresponds to the number of perceived or potential instances of cheating. 
No a priori predictions were made for this secondary analysis. It is plausible to 
hypothesize that either high or low-trusters would be more suspicious of the potential to 
cheat given the right circumstances. Intuitively, it makes sense that low trusters would be 
more cautious, and thus assume higher levels of potential cheating. However, Yamagishi 
and colleagues have shown that high-trusters may be more sensitive to trust-relevant 
information than low-trusters (Kikuchi, Watanabe & Yamagishi, 1997; Kosugi & 
Yamagishi, 1998), making the reverse hypothesis tenable: High trusters, when faced with
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an uncertain situation, will be more vigilant and select more cards than there less trusting 
counterparts.
Method
Participants
Two-hundred and three undergraduates (110 females, 93 males) enrolled in an 
introductory psychology course at The College of William and Mary participated in the 
experiment. Students did not receive compensation for their participation. However, 
participation was entirely voluntary and anonymous.
Material
Trust scale. Yamagishi’s trust scale is designed to measure the general degree of 
trust respondents feel for others (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1989; Yamagishi & 
Yamagishi, 1994). It is an 11-item, self-report questionnaire that asks respondents to 
rate, on a seven-point likert scale, the extent to which they agree or disagree with 11 
trust-related statements (1 = strongly agree, 7 = strongly disagree). Such statements 
include, “most people are basically honest” and “in today’s society, if you are not careful, 
people will use you” (reverse scored). Yamagishi has validated his trust scale across 
several studies (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1989) and established convergent validity with 
the more commonly used trust scale developed by Rotter (Yamagishi & Yamagishi,
1994).
Was on task. The Wason task used in Study 1 was a modified version of 
Cosmides’ (1989) Grover School scenario. The Grover school scenario includes a social 
contract condition and a non-social contract condition. All participants received either 
the social contract or non-social contract version of the Grover school task. Both
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versions use the rule “i f  a student is to be assigned to Grover High School, then that 
student must live in Grover City. ” The card choices, along with the correct answer, 
remain constant across both conditions. From left to right, the card choices read: Grover 
High School (p card), Town o f  Hanover (not-q card), Hanover High School (not-p card), 
and Grover City (q card). Solving the task requires selecting both the p  and not-q cards.
In the social contract version, the background story describes Grover High as 
being a superior school to Hanover High. Participants are cued into the perspective of 
someone assigned to monitor the individuals whose job it is to allocate students to 
particular high schools based on the rule. Furthermore, these individuals each have 
children entering high school and just happen to be responsible for their assignment.
Thus a motive exists for cheating on the above rule by placing ones own child in the 
better of the two schools, regardless of what city they live in. The non-social contract 
version has the same structure of the social contract rule except that the motive to cheat is 
removed by omitting any information regarding the differences between the two schools. 
However, the scenario is given a sense of importance of urgency by stating that 
population statistics are used to allocate the appropriate number of teachers to each 
school. Violations of the rule could lead to some schools getting too few teachers. 
Procedure
Study 1 was conducted in an introductory psychology course, at the beginning of 
a regularly scheduled class period. With the consent of the instructor, materials were 
handed out to participants as they entered the classroom and were told to keep them face 
down until instructed to turn them over. Students were informed that their participation 
in the study was completely voluntary and in no way would their identities be known to
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the experimenter. After a brief set of verbal instructions they were given ten minutes to 
complete the experimental packet. Participants were debriefed at the end of the semester 
through a mass email.
Design
Binary logistic regression was used to predict the probability of a participant 
correctly solving the Wason task. Binary logistic regression is the appropriate analysis 
when, 1) the criterion variable is dichotomous, and 2) some predictor variables are 
continuous, while others are categorical (Thrash, 2007). The predictor variables in the 
analysis were the Wason task version (Social contract versus Non-Social contract), the 
participant’s aggregated trust scale score, and a trust by Wason version interaction term.
Linear regression was used to determine if there was a relationship between the 
total number of cards a participant selected and his/her aggregated trust score. The 
criterion variable was the total number of cards selected and the predictors in the equation 
were Wason version, generalized trust scores, and the interaction between Wason version 
and trust.
Results
Manipulation Check
A chi-squared analysis was used to test the null hypothesis that there was no 
difference in Wason task performance between the social contract and non-social contract 
conditions. The results indicated a rejection of the null hypothesis, with the social 
contract group significantly outperforming the non-social contract group, % = 20.08 (1, N 
= 203), jd < .001. Specifically, 49.5% (50/101) of participants correctly solved the social 
contract Wason task, compared to only 19.6% (20/102) in the non-social contract
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condition. Overall, participants who were given the social contract Wason task were four 
times more likely to solve it correctly compared to those in the non-social contract 
condition. Although the percentage of participants solving the social contract Wason task 
correctly is somewhat lower then typically reported, the overall size and direction of the 
effect is highly consistent with previous research (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Gigerenzer 
& Hug, 1992).
Trust Moderating Social Exchange and Cheater Detection
Binary logistic regression was used to test the hypothesis that generalized trust 
moderates the relationship between social exchange and cheater detection (see Figure 1 
for a diagram of the model). Wason task performance (correct, incorrect) was regressed 
on the Wason task version variable (social contract, non-social contract), participants’ 
generalized trust scores, and the trust by Wason version interaction. Wason version was 
found to significantly predict Wason performance, P = .722, p  < .001. When controlling 
for the other variables in the model, participants in the social contract condition were 2.06 
times more likely to solve the Wason task correctly when compared to those in the non­
social contract condition. Participant trust scores failed to significantly predict Wason 
performance, p = .090,/? > .05. Finally, the trust by Wason version interaction was a 
significant predictor of Wason performance, p = .404,/? < .05 (see Table 1 for mean trust 
scores by condition). As depicted in Figure 2, trust scores were a significant predictor of 
Wason performance only in the social contract condition, p = .495,/? < .05. The odds 
ratio for the relationship between trust scores and Wason performance within the social 
contract condition was 1.64, meaning that every point of increase in a participant’s trust 
scores was associated with them being just over one and a half times more likely to solve
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the Wason task correctly. As predicted, trust scores had no effect on Wason performance 
in the non-social contract condition, p = -.312,/? > .05.
Trust and Suspicion
The total number of card selections made among those participants who solved 
the Wason task incorrectly was regressed on the Wason task version variable, 
participants’ generalized trust scores, and the trust by Wason version interaction. None 
of the variables were found to significantly predict the number of cards selected. Thus, in 
the context of the Wason task paradigm, generalized trust scores do not seem to be 
predictive of the level of suspicion participants have regarding the potential for cheating, 
as measured by the number of cards selected.
Discussion
The above results support hypothesis 1, that generalized trust moderates the 
relationship between social exchange and cheater detection. High-trusters were 
significantly better at solving the Wason task than low-trusts when social exchange 
content was present. This outcome supports Yamagishi’s suggestion that trusting 
individuals may be better at detecting cheaters than their less trusting counterparts 
(Kiyonari, Tanida, & Yamagishi, 2000). High-trusters are not only more sensitive to 
trust-relevant information, but appear to translate this vigilance into more accurate 
cheater detection. The finding that trust influences the activation of the CDM is a 
significant addition to SCT. Since its introduction, the proponents of SCT have argued 
that social exchange was the key to understanding the activation of the CDM. While 
study 1 supports this assertion, it goes beyond this aspect of SCT, suggesting that the 
CDM itself is calibrated by a personality variable (generalized trust) which Yamagishi
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hypothesizes to be a component of a larger cognitive system for the regulation of social 
exchange. This larger social exchange mechanism is made up of the SEH and the CDM. 
Both systems are essential, and represent adaptive solutions for the two primary obstacles 
on the road to the evolution of human cooperation: 1) having the motivation to adopt the 
goal of mutual cooperation, and 2) being able to detect and punish those who break the 
agreed upon contract of a social exchange.
Establishing a link between generalized trust and cheater detection, while 
consistent with both SEH and SCT, leaves several important questions unanswered.
First, is it that generalized trust affects cheater detection independent of Yamagishi’s 
sensitivity-to-information effect, or does this sensitivity-to-information mediate the 
relationship between trust and the CDM? That is, does generalized trust lead to increased 
levels of suspicion, which subsequently enhance cheater detection ability, or is 
generalized trust simply a common cause of suspicion and enhanced cheater detection? 
Second, Yamagishi conceives of trust as being calibrated by socio-cultural context, 
through the development of social intelligence. Does trust and its effect on cheater 
detection change based on socio-cultural context as Yamagishi predicts? And finally, is 
social intelligence ultimately responsible for the calibration of trust and the CDM? Study 
2 is designed to test the first question, while Study 3 addresses other two.
Study 2
Yamagishi has provided support for the hypothesis that high-trusters are more 
sensitive than low-trusters to information suggesting the untrustworthiness of an 
individual (Yamagishi, Kikuchi & Kosugi, 1999). However, this effect only occurs when 
negative information regarding the character of another person is presented. When
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positive or neutral information is presented about a target individual, the pattern reverses 
to a more intuitive outcome: low-trusters rate individuals as being more untrustworthy. 
Yamagishi explains this interaction between generalized trust and information type as a 
result of the SEH. That is, individuals with a stronger SEH (those exhibiting higher 
levels of trust) are more motivated to cooperate. In addition to adopting the goal of 
mutual cooperation, individuals with strong SEH’s expect interaction partners to 
cooperate as well. According to Yamagishi, the expectation that others will cooperate 
results in an increased sensitivity to cues that point towards an individuals 
untrustworthiness, resulting in increased levels of suspicion and vigilance when such 
dues are present. Yamagishi does not hypothesize a specific mechanism by which this 
informational sensitivity operates, nor does he provide evidence that this increased 
suspicion actually translates into an enhanced ability to detect instances of cheating. In 
light of these unanswered questions, Study 2 has two goals: 1) to provide a replication of 
Yamagishi’s hypothesized interaction between trust and information type, and 2) to test 
the hypothesis that suspicion scores mediate the relationship between generalized trust 
and cheater detection.
To provide a replication of Yamagishi’s sensitivity effect, participants were given 
trust scenarios (modeled off of Yamagishi’s original materials) and Yamagishi’s 
generalized trust scale. Three versions of the trust scenarios were created where 
information type was manipulated: Participants were assigned to a positive, negative or 
neutral information condition. They were asked to rate the probability of the person in 
the story acting in a trustworthy manner. A replication of Yamagishi’s findings will 
result if  there is a significant information condition by generalized trust score interaction.
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That is, high-trusters should only have significantly lower scenario scores (more 
suspicion that the person in the story will act in an untrustworthy manner) than low- 
trusters in the negative information condition.
To test the hypothesis that Yamagishi’s sensitivity to information effect ultimately 
mediates the relationship between generalized trust and cheater detection, participants in 
Study 2 were also asked to solve a social contract Wason task. A moderated-mediational 
model is posited, with trust scenario scores (suspicion scores) mediating the relationship 
between the trust by information condition interaction and cheater detection as measured 
by Wason task performance. Specifically, high levels of generalized trust, and its 
associated informational sensitivity, activate the SEH more readily, which causes 
individuals to simultaneously adopt the goal of mutual cooperation and expectation of 
cooperation by others. As a consequence, the CDM is activated, increasing suspicion and 
the resulting ability to better detect instances of cheating. However, this effect should be 
strongest in the negative information condition, where high-trusters have been shown to 
be particularly vigilant.
Method
Participants
One-hundred and eleven (65 females, 46 males) participants were recruited from 
an introductory psychology course at The College of Williams and Mary. Again, no 
compensation was awarded and participation was voluntary and anonymous.
Materials
Trust Scale. The version of Yamagishi’s Generalized Trust Scale used in Study 2 
was identical to the one used in Study 1.
28
Wason Task: The Grover School Wason task described in the Method section of 
Study 1 was used. However, only the social contract version of the task was used.
Trust Scenarios. Each participant received three short vignettes and was asked to 
estimate the probability that the person depicted in the story would act in a trustworthy 
manner. Participants were assigned to one of three conditions: the neutral information 
condition, the positive information condition, or the negative information condition. The 
neutral condition served as a baseline measure and consisted of a description of the 
situation with which the character in the story was confronted. In the positive and 
negative conditions, additional information about the person in the story was provided. 
The positive condition included information suggesting that the character in the story has 
acted trustworthy in the past, while the negative condition presents evidence calling the 
trustworthiness of the central character into question. For each of the three vignettes 
participants rated the probability (0-100%) that the person in the story would act in a 
trustworthy manner. Participant scores were calculated by summing their responses 
across the three stories. Higher scores indicate higher attributions of trustworthiness. 
Procedure
Study 2 employed the exact same procedure as Study 1 except that it was 
conducted in an alternate introductory psychology class.
Design
To replicate Yamagishi’s results, linear regression was used to predict suspicion 
scores from generalized trust scores, information type, and the crucial trust by 
information type interaction. Since there were three conditions within the information 
type variable, a set of orthogonal contrasts was created. The first contrast compares the
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negative information condition to the remaining two conditions, and the second contrast 
compares the positive and neutral information condition with each other. A hierarchical 
regression was conducted, in which the first step included generalized trust and the two 
aforementioned contrasts. In step two of the analysis, two interaction terms were entered 
into the equation, each representing the interaction between generalized trust and one of 
the contrast variables.
Logistic regression was employed to test the moderated-mediational model 
predicting cheater detection from suspicion scores and the generalized trust by 
information condition interaction. The model was tested by carrying out four smaller 
analyses that tested for the hypothesized mediation within each information type 
condition, as well as an overall effect, averaging across information condition. 
PRODCLIN was used to test for a significant indirect mediation for each of the four 
proposed models.
Results
Replication o f  Yamagishi
A pair of orthogonal contrasts was created from the information condition 
variable to test Yamagishi’s hypothesis that the relationship between generalized trust 
and levels of suspicion is moderated by information type (see Figure 3 for a diagram of 
the model). The first contrast compares the negative information condition to the other 
two conditions, whereas the second compared the positive information condition with the 
neutral condition. A two-step hierarchical regression was used to determine'if 
generalized trust interacted with the information condition contrasts. In step one of the 
analysis, suspicion scores were regressed on generalized trust and the two information
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condition contrasts. The overall model tested in step one was significant (F = 7.508,/? < 
.001), R2 = .174. Step two of the analysis added the two crucial trust by contrast
'y
interactions. As measured by the change in R , model 2, with the interaction terms 
included, was a better predictor of suspicion scores than step one of the analysis, R =
.655 (F = 23.41,/? < .001). Table 2 provides a list of all the beta values for both steps of 
the analysis. Importantly, both contrasts significantly interacted with generalized trust to 
predict suspicion scores. As Figure 4 shows, low-trusters are more suspicious of others 
than high-trusters in the neutral and positive information conditions. However, as 
Yamagishi predicts, the pattern reverses in the negative information condition, with high- 
trusters becoming more vigilant (see Table 3 for mean suspicion scores by condition). 
These results provide a convincing replication of Yamagishi’s sensitivity-to-information 
effect despite using an abridged version of his original materials.
Connecting Informational Sensitivity to Cheater Detection
The second analysis in Study 2 tested a model in which information type 
moderated the role of suspicion scores as a mediator between generalized trust and 
cheater detection (see Figure 5 for a diagram of the model). Path A of the model 
corresponds to the interactive effects of generalized trust and information type on 
suspicion scores, while path B represents how well Wason performance can be predicted 
from suspicion scores when controlling for generalized trust. Beta weights were 
calculated for each path and PRODCLIN was used to test for indirect mediated effects. 
The analysis was broken up into four parts: the overall effect when averaging across 
information type, and one analysis for each information condition. Table 4 shows the 
path coefficients for each of the four models. No evidence of indirect mediation was
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found in any of the tested models. As expected, generalized trust was a significant 
predictor of suspicion scores in each of the four analyses.
Discussion
One plausible causal model that results from combining the predictions of the 
SEH and SCT is that trust interacts with information type to predict levels of suspicion 
(informational sensitivity), which in turn predict the accuracy of cheater detection. 
Although the design of Study 2 is not sufficient to decisively confirm or rule out such a 
causal model, the specific pattern of results are not consistent with the proposed 
hypothesis. That is, the relationship between the generalized trust/information type 
interaction and cheater detection was not found to be mediated by suspicion scores. 
Although Yamagishi’s sensitivity to information effect was replicated in study 2, it failed 
to predict Wason performance about and beyond generalized trust alone. A participant’s 
level of suspicion was not related to Wason performance regardless of the type of 
information they were given. The results of Study 2 are more consistent with an 
alternative explanation: that generalized trust separately influences suspicion and cheater 
detection and there is no causal path leading from generalized trust, to suspicion scores, 
and finally to cheater detection. In other words, it does not seem to be the case that levels 
of suspicion, as measures by Yamagishi’s trust scenarios have anything to do with the 
activation of the CDM.
One potential reason for the dissociation between suspicion and cheater detection 
is the nature of Yamagishi’s trust scenarios. They essentially ask participants to rate how 
suspicious they are of the trustworthiness of a character in a story. The person depicted 
in the story is not a potential exchange partner and a very limited amount of information
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is provided. Perhaps if the measure of suspicion were obtained in such a way as to make 
the “other’s” degree of trustworthiness more personally salient to participants, a 
connection between trust, suspicion, and cheater detection would be found.
Study 3
Yamagishi has shown that levels of generalized trust are calibrated in an adaptive 
way towards an individual’s specific socio-cultural environment (Yamagishi, Kikuchi, & 
Kosugi, 1999). High-trusters exhibit increased sensitivity to trust-relevant information as 
a result of an environment with high levels of social uncertainty and opportunity cost. 
Such a dynamic and unpredictable environment requires high levels of trust to facilitate 
cooperative interaction, and also a high degree of vigilance against exploitation. On the 
other hand, low-trust is better suited to an environment characterized by low levels of 
social uncertainty and opportunity cost. The stability of such an environment precludes 
the need for high levels of trust and vigilance.
To test if the above relationship holds when high and low trusters are actually 
asked to detect instances of cheating, a social contract Wason task was administered to 
participants. In one condition the Wason task describes a situation in which there is a 
high degree of social uncertainty and opportunity cost (HC version). The scenario in the 
second version is characterized by low levels of social uncertainty and opportunity cost 
(LC version). If high levels of trust and its resulting sensitivity to information are 
particularly beneficial when opportunity cost and social uncertainty are high, then high- 
trusters should outperform low-trusters on the HC Wason task. Trust should not affect 
performance on the LC version of the task since the increased vigilance associated with 
high levels of trust is not as advantageous within such a predictable context.
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A second purpose of Study 3 is to test Yamagishi’s suggestion that trust may be 
calibrated through repeated interaction within a given socio-cultural context (i.e. HC 
versus LC). One mechanism by which trust may develop is through the acquisition of 
social intelligence (Yamagishi, 1998). Social intelligence affects an individual’s ability 
to accurately read a social situation and act accordingly. Yamagishi has argued that HC 
environments, characterized by a high degree of uncertain interactions with others, results 
in the development of higher levels of social intelligence. Conversely, individuals in LC 
environments have fewer opportunities to develop social intelligence since interactions 
are fewer and much more predictable. To test the relationship between trust and social 
intelligence, participants were given the Tromso Social Intelligence Scale. It is 
hypothesized that generalized trust scores will mediate the relationship between social 
intelligence and Wason performance. The preceding hypothesis tests a model consistent 
with Yamagishi’s suggestion that social intelligence drives generalized trust levels, which 
in turn calibrate the CDM.
Method
Participants
One-hundred and two undergraduates were recruited from the Psychology 
department subject pool, which is made up of students enrolled in introductory 
psychology courses at the College of William and Mary. Students were awarded course 
credit for their participation in the study. Participants signed up for the study voluntarily 
and their identities remained anonymous.
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Materials
The experimental packet handed out to participants in Study 3 contained a consent 
form, Yamagishi’s Generalized Trust Scale, the Tromso Social Intelligence scale, and a 
Wason task.
Trust Scale. The version of Yamagishi’s Generalized Trust Scale used in Study 3, 
was identical to the one used in Studies 1 and 2.
Social Intelligence Scale. The English version of the Tromso Social Intelligence 
Scale (TSIS) was used. The TSIS is a 21-item self-report measure designed to assess 
abilities related to the social intelligence construct. Participants rate, on a 7-point likert 
scale, the degree to which a given statement describes them (1 = describes me poorly, 7 = 
describes me extremely well). Such statements include, “I can predict other people’s 
behavior” and “I know how my actions will make others feel.” The TSIS has been 
shown to have good internal reliability and be reasonably free of response bias (Silvera, 
Martinussen, & Dahl, 2001).
Wason Task. The novel Wason tasks created for Study 3 were adapted from 
Kollock’ s (1994) analysis of the rubber trade in Southeast Asia. The rubber scenario had 
two conditions, a low opportunity cost, low social uncertainty condition (LC), and a high 
opportunity cost, high social uncertainty condition (HC). Both versions of the rubber 
scenario were social contracts. All participants received either the LC or HC scenario. 
The two versions of the task shared the following rule: “i f  rubber is to be sold for a high 
price, then it must be o f  a high quality. ” The card choices, along with the correct answer, 
remain constant across both conditions. From left to right, the card choices read: High 
Price (p card), Low Price {not-q card), High Quality {not-p card), and Low Quality (q
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card). As with the previous versions of Wason tasks used, solving the task requires 
selecting both the p  and not-q cards.
Both versions of the Rubber scenario share a background story that cue the 
participant into the perspective of a member of a small Indonesian community that 
specializes in the processing of raw rubber. The participant holds the important job of 
traveling to a nearby market to purchase raw rubber for the community. The purchasing 
of raw rubber is a difficult task because it is nearly impossible to determine the quality of 
raw rubber until after it is processed. Low quality raw rubber would result in low quality 
finished products, jeopardizing the community’s primary source of income. In the LC 
version, the community has a long standing relationship with one of the only nearby raw 
rubber merchant (low opportunity cost); his prices tend been fair, and his raw rubber has 
been of a consistently high quality (low social uncertainty). However, in the HC version, 
there are many raw rubber merchants to choose from (high opportunity cost), and it is a 
well know fact that these merchants tend to lie about the quality of their rubber (high 
social uncertainty).
Procedure
As partial satisfaction of a course requirement, undergraduates enrolled in 
introductory psychology classes signed up for Study 3 through the Psychology 
department’s online research participation system. Three experimental sessions were 
held over the course of one week in a medium sized classroom. Upon arrival, 
participants were handed out the experimental packet and allowed as much time as they 
needed to finish. Generally, the experiment took 10-15 minutes to complete. When 
finished, participants were given a short debriefing form and allowed to leave.
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Design
Binary logistic regression was used to determine if there was a relationship 
between socio-cultural context and trust when detecting instances of cheating. The 
criterion variable was Wason task performance, and the predictors in the equation were 
Wason version (LC, HC), generalized trust scores, and a Wason version by trust score 
interaction term.
As an initial test of Yamagishi’s hypothesis that social intelligence calibrates 
levels of trust based on socio-cultural context, a model was tested in which generalized 
trust scores were hypothesized to mediate the relationship between social intelligence and 
Wason task performance. The criterion variable was Wason performance, and the 
predictors in the model were participant generalized trust and social intelligence scores.
Results
Manipulation Check
Since both versions of the Wason task used in Study 3 described social contracts, 
there should be no performance differences across the two conditions. A chi-squared 
analysis revealed no difference in correct answers between the HC and LC conditions, %
= .538 (1, N = 102),p  > .05. Participants in the LC condition solved the task correctly 
58% (29/50) of the time, while the HC version of the task was solved correctly in 52% 
(27/52) of the cases.
Socio-cultural Context Moderates Trust and Cheater Detection
Binary logistic regression was used to test the hypothesis that socio-cultural 
context moderates the relationship between trust and cheater detection (see Figure 6 for a 
diagram of the model). Wason performance was regressed on the Wason task variable
37
(HC, LC), generalized trust scores, and a Wason version by trust score interaction term 
(see Table 5 for mean trust scores by condition). Consistent with the manipulation check, 
Wason version was not found to be a significant predictor of Wason performance, p =
.004,p >  .05. However, generalized trust scores significantly predicted Wason task 
performance, p = .702, p  < .05. Every point of increase in a participant’s generalized 
trust score was associated with them being 2.02 times more likely to correctly solve the 
Wason task, regardless of the version with which they were presented. Finally, as 
hypothesized, the interaction between Wason version and generalized trust was found to 
significantly predict Wason performance, P = .937, p  < .01. As shown in Figure 7, trust 
failed to predict Wason performance on LC version of the task, p = -.249,/? > .05. 
However, among those given the HC version of the task, trust significantly predicted 
Wason performance, p = 1.616, p  < .01. Specifically, for every one point increase in 
participants trust scores, they were 5.03 times more likely to solve the HC Wason task 
correctly.
Social Intelligence as a Developmental Precursor o f  Trust
PRODCLIN was used to test the significance of the model where generalized trust 
mediates the relationship between social intelligence and cheater detection (see Figure 8 
for a diagram of the model). Path A denotes the relationship between social intelligence 
and trust, while path B represents the relationship between trust and Wason performance 
when controlling for social intelligence. Path A, regressing trust scores on the social 
intelligence variable, failed to produce a significant effect, p = .177,/? > .05. Path B of 
the model was consistent with the previous analyses. That is, when controlling for social 
intelligence, generalized trust was found to significantly predict Wason performance, p =
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.461 ,p  < .05. Participants were 1.6 times more likely to. solve the Wason task correctly 
for every point of increase in their trust scores. The mean trust score for those who 
solved the Wason task correctly was 47.9 (SD = 7.24), and 44.5 (SD =7.62) for those 
who solved the task incorrectly. Using PRODCLIN, the product of the coefficients for 
paths A and B failed to reach statistical significance at an alpha level of .05. These 
results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that generalized trust mediates the 
relationship between social intelligence and cheater detection.
Discussion
The results of Study 3 are consistent with the hypothesis that socio-cultural 
context moderates the previously established relationship between generalized trust and 
cheater detection. High-trusters appeared better equipped than low-trusters to detect 
cheating when presented with a social contract Wason scenario characterized by a high 
degree of social uncertainty and opportunity cost. However, when the Wason scenario 
presented a much more stable social environment, the trust effect went away. These 
results are consistent with Yamagishi’s argument that levels of trust are calibrated by the 
interaction of an individual with his social environment (Yamagishi, Kikuchi, & Kosugi,
1999). Under conditions of social uncertainty and high opportunity cost, developing a 
high degree of generalized trust acts as a social lubricant, motivating individuals to enter 
into social exchange with strangers. However, given the unpredictable nature of such an 
environment, it would be essential to be vigilant of the potential to be exploited. Thus, if 
high-trusters are more familiar with and better adapted to such unpredictable 
environments, they should outperform low-trusters when presented with the task of 
detecting cheaters under such conditions. On the other hand, if trust and cheater
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detection are less important in a social environment characterized by low levels of 
uncertainty and opportunity cost, high-trusters will lose their performance advantage.
The second analysis of Study 3 tested a causal model in which social intelligence 
was responsible for calibrating both generalized trust and the CDM. The results were not 
consistent with this hypothesis. Social intelligence failed to significantly predict 
generalized trust scores and Wason performance. Three potential reasons exist for these 
null findings. First, the Tromso social intelligence scale was originally published in 
Italian and there have been a limited number of studies validating the scale in English. 
Second, social intelligence as a construct is ill defined and significant disagreement exists 
regard its usefulness as a construct. Given the fragmentary nature of social intelligence 
research and the lack of a consistent operational definition with a well established 
measurement tool, it is often a problematic construct to apply (Landy, 2006). Finally, it 
may be the case that social intelligence is unrelated to the development of generalized 
trust and cheater detection. Neither Yamagishi’s SEH or the connection between 
generalized trust and the CDM hinge on social intelligence being a common causative 
factor. In fact, there may be no need to evoke an additional construct at all when 
hypothesizing about the development of the SEH or the CDM. Indeed, SCT specifically 
proposes that the CDM is a cognitive mechanism designed, that is, pre-equipped, with the 
necessary “algorithms” to perform its task (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). The very idea of 
an evolved cognitive module or mental organ implies that it is automatically sensitive to a 
certain domain of information (i.e. the domain of social exchange).
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General Discussion 
The current study found mixed results in regard to its central focus: the 
integration of the SEH and SCT. Generalized trust was found to moderate cheater 
detection in the predicted direction -  high-trusters .were better at solving social contract 
Wason tasks than low-trusters. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the 
CDM is influenced by generalized levels of trust. In addition, socio-cultural context was 
found to moderate the relationship between generalized trust and Wason performance, 
suggesting that environmental cues may adaptively calibrate generalized trust and the 
CDM. Despite replicating Yamagishi’s sensitivity-to-information effect, levels of 
suspicion were not related to Wason performance, indicating that vigilance and cheater 
detection may be separate constructs. Finally, social intelligence was not found to be 
predictive of generalized trust or cheater detection, results that are inconsistent with the 
causal model proposed by Yamagishi.
Despite mixed findings, the pattern of results suggests that the SEH and the CDM 
are linked in an adaptive way. Specifically, the results are consistent with the prediction 
that generalized trust seems to be calibrated by one’s socio-cultural environment, which 
in turn influences the activation of the CDM within social exchanges. The SEH predicts 
that generalized trust is regulated by two social exchange variables: social uncertainty 
and opportunity costs (Kiyonari, Tanida, & Yamagishi, 2000). High levels of generalized 
trust are fostered when social uncertainty and opportunity costs are high (such as in the 
United States). These high levels of trust are meant to facilitate exchange between 
potential interaction partners. At the same time, Yamagishi argues that given the 
unpredictable nature of such an environment, one must be particularly vigilant of
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exploitation. As such, high-trusters also have to be more sensitive to cues to a potential 
interaction partner’s untrustworthiness. Yamagishi does not hypothesize about a 
particular mechanism by which this vigilance occurs. However, it is presently 
hypothesized that, consistent with SCT, it is the CDM that facilitates the enhanced 
detection of cheaters. Although evidence for a direct causal path between generalized 
trust, suspicion scores, and cheater detection was not found in the current study, cheater 
detection appears to be closely linked to the relationship between socio-cultural context 
and generalized trust. For example, in an environment characterized by high social 
uncertainty and high opportunity cost, high generalized trust and accurate cheater 
detection are particularly beneficial. This is precisely what the results of Study 3 support. 
High-trusters significantly outperformed low-trusters in the detection of cheaters when 
they were presented with a Wason task characterized by high social uncertainty and 
opportunity cost. The benefits of high generalized trust and its subsequent enhanced 
cheater detection disappeared when participants were asked to solve a Wason task 
characterized by low-levels of social uncertainty and opportunity cost.
Implications for Social Exchange Theory and the Social Exchange Heuristic
The results of the current study have implications for both SCT and the SEH.
Since its development, SCT has sought to uncover the design features of the hypothesized 
CDM. However, research has focused entirely on the external cues that activate the 
CDM -  the presence of a social contract. However, the current research identifies an 
additional, developmental, design feature of the CDM. That is, the CDM may have 
evolved to be sensitive to consistent patterns of social relationships within an individual’s 
environment. Levels of social uncertainty and opportunity cost and their subsequent
42
effect on generalized trust act to fine tune one’s ability to detect cheating. Put simply, if 
highly accurate cheater detection ability is needed, more cognitive resources are invested 
in its development. However, if one’s environment is relatively stable and predictable, 
resources may be invested elsewhere.
In regards to the SEH, the present results suggest that Yamagishi’s adoption of the 
goal/expectancy framework was valid. When looked at in conjunction with his research, 
the present study argues for a connection between the motivation to cooperate (strong 
SEH) and the ability to detect cheaters. However, Yamagishi’s sensitivity-to-information 
effect, which provided the impetus for many of his later predictions, did not appear to be 
related to cheater detection. Although it intuitively makes sense that those who are more 
suspicious of other’s trustworthiness would excel at the detection of cheaters, there is no 
theoretical reason why this would be the case. The activation of the GDM is not 
hypothesized to be a conscious process, and as such, there is no reason that it need be 
associated with identifiable behavioral markers, such as increased suspiciousness. 
Conclusion
As Yamagishi (1998) suggests, the relationship between the SEH and the CDM is 
best captured by the goal/expectation theory of cooperation (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977). To 
achieve consistent mutual cooperation within a social exchange, two conditions have to 
be met. First, individuals have to be motivated to abandon the strict pursuit of self- 
interest and adopt the goal of mutual cooperation. Second, to protect from the costs of 
exploitation, individuals must be capable of detecting cheaters. The SEH, which is 
hypothesized to facilitate cooperative interaction, results in the adoption of mutual benefit 
as a goal. Once that has been established individuals need a way to ensure that their
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exchange partner will cooperate as well. The CDM is responsible for solving this 
adaptive problem. As the results of Yamagishi and the current author suggest, trust is a 
component of the goal/expectation model. As levels of generalized trust increase, both 
the goal and expectation of mutual cooperation become stronger (a stronger SEH) and 
consequently the CDM becomes more finely tuned to an environment where the potential 
to be exploited is more prevalent.
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Table 1
Mean Trust Scores by Condition
Social Contract Non-Social Contract
M SD M SD
Wason Correct 45.82 7.99 43.95 12.87
Wason Incorrect 42.29 7.50 46.72 6.90
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Table 2
Variables Predicting Wason Performance
Step 1 Step 2
* P S.E P P S.E. P
Generalized Trust 0.318 4.095 0.001 0.689 4.257 <.001
Contrast 1 -0.258 4.293 0.025 -0.242 3.619 0.013
Contrast 2 6.432 0.318 0.006 0.262 5.422 0.007
Trust X Cl n/a n/a n/a -0.752 3.619 <.001
Trust X C2 n/a n/a n/a 0.515 5.694 <.001
Note. Contrast 1 = negative information vs. positive/neutral information; Contrast 2 = 
positive information vs. neutral information.
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Table 3
Mean Suspicion Scores by Condition
Neutral Information Negative Information Positive Information
M SD M SD M SD
High Trust 162.00 27.75 85.56 28.77 194.00 24.59
Low Trust 75.56 22.97 130.00 12.25 103.33 32.04
52
Table 4
Path Coefficients for Moderated Mediational Model
Overall Model Neutral Info Negative Info Positive Info
(3 S.E. p P S.E. p P S.E. p p S.E. p
Path
A 0.332 0.090 <.001 0.581 0.084 <.001 0.374 0.117 <.01 0.796 0.170 <.001
Path
B 0.245 0.237 >.05 0.331 0.761 >.05 0.059 0.498 >.05 .401 0.480 >.05
Note. Path A = Predicting suspicion scores from generalized trust; Path B = Predicting 
Wason performance from suspicion scores while controlling for generalized trust.
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Table 5
Mean Trust Scores by Condition
LC HC
M SD M SD
Wason Correct 46.41 6.44 49.44 7.81
Wason Incorrect 48.19 8.74 41.4 4.82
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Model predicting that generalized trust moderates the relationship between 
social exchange and cheater detection ability.
Figure 2. Interactive effects of generalized trust and Wason version on Wason 
performance.
Figure 3. Model Predicting that information type moderates the relationship between 
generalized trust and level of suspicion.
Figure 4. Interactive effects of generalized trust and information type on Wason 
performance.
Figure 5. Model predicting that information type moderates the mediation of generalized 
trust and cheater detection by level of suspicion.
Figure 6. Model predicting that socio-cultural context moderates the relationship between 
generalized trust and cheater detection ability.
Figure 7. Interactive effects of generalized trust and socio-cultural context on Wason 
performance.
Figure 8. Model predicting that generalized trust mediates the relationship between social 
intelligence and cheater detection ability.
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Appendix A -  Study 1 Materials
Social Contract Wason Task
Imagine you are a member of your county’s Board of Education, supervising four 
volunteers who work for the Board. Part of your job is to double-check the assignment of 
students to the appropriate school by these volunteers, who are supposed to follow certain rules 
for assigning students from various towns to the appropriate school district.
Students are to be assigned either to Grover High School, which is located in Grover 
City, or to Hanover High School, which is located in the town of Hanover. It is important that 
certain rules for assigning students from various towns to the appropriate school district are 
followed, because parents would much rather have their children attend Grover High than 
Hanover High. Grover High is a great school with an excellent record for getting students placed 
in good colleges. In contrast, Hanover High is a mediocre school with poor teachers and decrepit 
facilities.
The Board of Education took these factors into account when it created rules to determine 
which school a student is to be assigned to. The most important of these rules is:
“If a student is to be assigned to Grover High School, then that student
must live in Grover City.”
Each volunteer is the parent of a teenager who is about to enter high school, and each 
processed his own child’s document. The volunteers were supposed to follow this rule when 
processing all student documents— including the documents of their own children. It is your job 
to make sure that the volunteers did not deliberately break the rule when assigning their own 
children to high schools.
Imagine the boxes below represent cards that have information about the documents of 
the four volunteer’s children. Each card represents the child of one volunteer. One side of a card 
tells what school the volunteer assigned to their child, and the other side of the card tells what 
town that student lives in. Please circle “yes” on only those card(s) you definitely need to turn 
over to see if the documents of any of these students violate the rule and circle “no” for the cards 
that do not need to be turned over.
Grover School Town of Hanover Hanover School Grover City
yes no yes no yes no yes no
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Non-Social Contract Wason Task
Imagine you are a member of your county’s Board of Education, supervising four 
volunteers who work for the Board. Part of your job is to double-check the assignment of 
students to the appropriate school by these volunteers, who are supposed to follow certain rules 
for assigning students from various towns to the appropriate school district.
Students are to be assigned either to Grover High School, which is located in Grover 
City, or to Hanover High School, which is located in the town of Hanover. It is important that 
certain rules for assigning students from various towns to the appropriate school district are 
followed, because the population statistics they provide allow the Board of Education to decide 
how many teachers need to be assigned to each school. If these rules are not followed some 
schools could end up with too many teachers, and other schools with too few.
The Board of Education took these factors into account when it created rules to determine 
which school a student is to be assigned to. The most important of these rules is:
“If a student is to be assigned to Grover High School, then that student
must live in Grover City.”
Your volunteers were supposed to follow this rule when processing all student 
documents. However, mistakes can happen. It is your job to make sure that the volunteers did 
not inadvertently break the rule when assigning any students to high schools.
Imagine the boxes below represent cards that have information about the documents of 
four children. Each card represents one child. One side of a card tells what school the volunteer 
assigned the child to, and the other side of the card tells what town that student lives in. Please 
circle “yes” on only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see if the documents of any 
of these students violate the rule and circle “no” for the cards that do not need to be turned over.
Grover School Town of Hanover Hanover School Grover City
yes no yes no yes no yes no
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Yamagishi Generalized Trust Scale
Directions: Indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each statement by 
using the following scale:
1 = strongly agree
2 = moderately agree
3 = mildly agree
4 = agree and disagree equally
5 = mildly disagree
6 = moderately disagree
7 = strongly disagree
1. Most people are basically honest.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Most people are trustworthy.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. People always think about their own gain.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Most people trust a person if the person trusts them.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. In today’s society, if you are not careful, people will use you.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. In today’s society, we do not have to worry about being used by someone.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. Most people are basically good-natured and kind.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. Most people trust others.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. Most people really do not like to make the effort to help others.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. If we assume everyone has the capacity to be malicious, we will not be in trouble.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. Generally, I trust others.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Appendix B -  Study 2 Materials
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Neutral Suspicion Scenario
Directions: Please read the following three scenarios carefully and respond to the 
questions as accurately as possible.
Scenario 1:
Nate, an American traveling abroad, stayed three nights in a London hotel. Upon 
checking out, Nate realized he was only charged for one night. The hotel was very busy 
and Nate knew that if he didn’t speak up, the hotel clerk would not catch the mistake.
What is the probability that Nate will notify the hotel clerk that he has been undercharged
for the room?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
100%
Scenario 2:
Matt has just finished up lunch at his favorite restaurant. After paying in cash, the 
waiter returns with matt’s change. Matt notices that the waiter has miscounted the 
change, leaving him too much money. The waiter did not realize his mistake and Matt 
knows that he will be able to get away with the extra change if he wants.
What is the probability that matt will notify the waiter that he has been given too much 
change?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
100%
Scenario 3:
John has just purchased a new car with the basic warranty. Once home, John 
noticed that the dealership had unknowingly given him the extended warranty without 
tacking on any extra charges to his bill. Since the contract had been signed, John knew 
that the dealership had to honor the upgraded warranty even though John didn’t pay for it.
What is the probability that John will notify the dealership that he has accidentally been 
given the extended warranty?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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Positive Suspicion Scenario
Directions: Please read the following three scenarios carefully and respond to the 
questions as accurately as possible.
Scenario 1:
Nate, an American traveling abroad, stayed three nights in a London hotel. The 
hotel is very busy and Nate had to wait in line to check out. While in line, Nate allowed 
an el'derly guest to cut in front of him. Upon checking out, Nate noticed he was only 
charged for one night. Since the hotel was very busy, Nate realized that if he didn’t 
speak up, the hotel clerk would never catch the mistake.
What is the probability that Nate will notify the hotel clerk that he has been 
undercharged for the room?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% ’ 80% 90%
100%
Scenario 2:
Matt has just finished up lunch at his favorite restaurant. Before settling his bill, 
Matt goes to the bathroom to wash his hands. On the way back to his table Matt picks up 
a piece of trash on the floor and throws it away. After paying in cash, the waiter returns 
with matt’s change. He notices that the waiter has miscounted the change, leaving him 
too much money. The waiter did not realize his mistake and Matt knows that he will be 
able to get away with the extra change if he wants.
What is the probability that matt will notify the waiter that he has been given too 
much change?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
100%
Scenario 3:
John has just purchased a new car with the basic warranty. While driving home in 
his new car John allowed an impatient driver to pass him on the freeway. Once home, 
John noticed that the dealership had unknowingly given him the extended warranty 
without tacking on any extra charges to his bill. Since the contract had been signed, John 
knew that the dealership had to honor the upgraded warranty even though John didn’t pay 
for it.
What is the probability that John will notify the dealership that he has accidentally 
been given the extended warranty?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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Negative Suspicion Scenario
Directions: Please read the following three scenarios carefully and respond to the 
questions as accurately as possible.
Scenario 1:
Nate, an American traveling abroad, stayed three nights in a London hotel. The 
hotel is very busy and Nate had to wait in line to check out. Instead of getting in the back 
of the line, Nate cut in front of another hotel guest. Upon checking out, Nate noticed he 
was only charged for one night. Since the hotel was very busy, Nate realized that if he 
didn’t speak up the hotel clerk would never catch the mistake.
What is the probability that Nate will notify the hotel clerk that he has been 
undercharged for the room?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
100%
Scenario 2:
Matt has just finished up lunch at his favorite restaurant. Before settling his bill, 
Matt goes to the bathroom to wash his hands. On the way back to his table Matt empties 
out the trash in his pockets onto the restaurant floor. After paying in cash, the waiter 
returns with matt’s change. He notices that the waiter has miscounted the change, 
leaving him too much money. The waiter did not realize his mistake and Matt knows that 
he will be able to get away with the extra change if he wants.
What is the probability that matt will notify the waiter that he has been given too 
much change?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
100%
Scenario 3:
John has just purchased a new car with the basic warranty. While driving home in 
his new car John cuts off a slower driver on the highway. Once home, John noticed that 
the dealership had unknowingly given him the extended warranty without tacking on any 
extra charges to his bill. Since the contract had been signed, John knew that the 
dealership had to honor the upgraded warranty even though John didn’t pay for it.
What is the probability that John will notify the dealership that he has accidentally 
been given the extended warranty?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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Tromso Social Intelligence Scale
Directions: Indicate the degree to which the statements below describe you by using the 
following scale:
1 = Describes me poorly
2
3
4
5
6
7 = Describes me extremely well
1 .1 can predict other peoples’ behavior.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 .1 often feel that it is difficult to understand other’s choices.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3 .1 know how my actions will make others feel.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4 .1 often feel uncertain around new people who I don’t know.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. People often surprise me with the things they do.
1 2  3 4 5 6 7
6 .1 understand other peoples’ feelings.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7 .1 fit in easily in social situations.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. Other people become angry with me without me being able to explain why.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9 .1 understand others’ wishes.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10.1 am good at entering new situations and meeting people for the first time. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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11. It seems as though people are often angry or irritated with me when I say what I 
think.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12.1 have a hard time getting along with other people.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13.1 find people unpredictable.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14.1 can often understand what others are trying to accomplish without the need for them 
to say anything.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
15. It takes a long time to get to know others well.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
16. I have often hurt others without realizing it.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
17.1 can predict how others will react to my behavior.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
18.1 am good at getting on good terms with new people.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
19.1 can often understand what others really mean through their expression, body 
language, etc..
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 0 .1 frequently have problems finding good conversation topics.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
21.1 am often surprised by others’ reactions to what I do.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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HC Wason Task
Imagine you are a member of a small community in Thailand that specializes in 
the processing of raw rubber into simple products. It is your job to travel to a large 
market several miles away in order to purchase raw rubber for your community. The 
buying of raw rubber is a difficult task because it is nearly impossible to determine the 
quality of the rubber until after it is processed and manufactured. Since the quality of the 
finished product is highly dependent on the quality of raw rubber used, purchasing high 
quality raw rubber is of vital importance for the livelihood of your community.
The market has many different raw rubber merchants, and none of them offer 
guarantees on their product. To make matters worse, the raw rubber trade is a volatile 
business with new merchants coming and going all the time.
To help ensure that raw rubber merchants do not attempt to cheat their customers 
the market has the following rule in place:
“If rubber is to be sold for a high price, then it must be o f a high quality.”
Despite this rule, many merchants tend to over-price low quality raw rubber, 
knowing that it is nearly impossible to detect. On this particular occasion you are 
comparing the raw rubber from four different merchants. It is your task to make sure that 
none of the bundles you are interested in have been over-priced.
Imagine the boxes below represent cards that have information about the raw 
rubber of four merchants. Each card represents information for one merchant. One side 
of a card tells the price of the rubber, and the other side of the card tells the quality of the 
raw rubber. Please circle “yes” on only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to 
see if any of the merchants violated the rule and circle “no” for the cards that do not need 
to be turned over.
High Price Low Price High Quality Low Quality
yes no yes no yes no yes no
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LC Wason Task
Imagine you are a member of a small community in Thailand that specializes in 
the processing of raw rubber into simple products. It is your job to travel to a large 
market several miles away in order to purchase raw rubber for your community. The 
buying of raw rubber is a difficult task because it is nearly impossible to determine the 
quality of the rubber until after it is processed and manufactured. Since the quality of the 
finished product is highly dependent on the quality of raw rubber used, purchasing high 
quality raw rubber is of vital importance for the livelihood of your community.
To ensure that your community only gets high quality raw rubber, you have 
formed a long-standing relationship with a single raw rubber merchant. You have dealt 
with this single merchant for several years and have resisted the temptation to purchase 
cheaper raw rubber, of unknown quality, from other merchants.
You and this particular rubber merchant have a rule in place to ensure that the raw 
rubber you purchase for your community is of a high quality. The rule is as follows:
“If rubber is to be sold for a high price, then it must be o f a high quality.”
On this particular occasion the raw rubber merchant you have formed a 
relationship with has four bundles of rubber. They are priced differently and you are not 
certain why. It is your task to make sure that none of the bundles you are interested in 
have been over-priced.
Imagine the boxes below represent cards that have information about the four 
bundles of raw rubber. Each card represents information for one bundle. One side of a 
card tells the price of the rubber, and the other side of the card tells the quality of the 
rubber. Please circle “yes” on only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see if 
any of the bundles of raw rubber violate the rule and circle “no” for the cards that do not 
need to be turned over.
High Price Low Price High Quality Low Quality
yes no yes no yes no yes no
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